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A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO LIE IN
CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS?
Richard L. Hasen*

I. INTRODUCTION
Election 2012 may well go down in history as the “4 Pinocchios Election.” It is perhaps no coincidence that the recent election season saw both
a rise in the amount of arguably false campaign speech and the proliferation
of journalistic “fact checkers” who regularly rate statements made by candidates and campaigns.1 Journalistic ratings such as PolitiFact’s “Truth-ometer” rank candidate statements from “true” and “mostly true” to “false”
and even “pants on fire.”2 The Washington Post rating system, which relies
upon the judgment of its fact checker, Glenn Kessler, uses one to four “Pinocchios” for false statements.3 The granddaddy of fact checking groups,
FactCheck.org, while avoiding a rating system, offers analysis that regularly describes controversial campaign claims as “false” or “wrong.”4
Both the Romney and Obama 2012 presidential campaigns received
stinging ratings from fact checkers. The Washington Post’s fact checker,
Glenn Kessler, gave the Obama campaign “4 Pinocchios” for claiming that
Mitt Romney, while working at Bain Capital, “outsourced” jobs and was a
“corporate raider.”5 Romney’s campaign similarly got “4 Pinocchios” for
* Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, UC Irvine School of Law. This Article
was prepared for presentation at the Montana Law Review’s Honorable James R. Browning Symposium
on Election Law: The State of the Republican Form of Government in the States, The University of
Montana School of Law, September 27–28, 2012. Thanks to Erwin Chemerinsky, Josh Douglas, Dan
Lowenstein, Bill Marshall, and Tim Zick for useful comments and suggestions, and to Jim Buatti for
research assistance.
1. Michael Cooper, Campaigns Play Loose with Truth in Fact-Check Age, New York Times, http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2012/09/01/us/politics/fact-checkers-howl-but-both-sides-cling-to-false-ads.html
(Aug. 31, 2012).
2. See PolitiFact, About PolitiFact, Tampa Bay Times, www.politifact.com/about (accessed Oct.
31, 2012) (“PolitiFact is a project of the Tampa Bay Times and its partners to help you find the truth in
politics. Every day, reporters and researchers from PolitiFact and its partner news organization examine
statements by members of Congress, state legislators, governors, mayors, the president, cabinet secretaries, lobbyists, people who testify before Congress and anyone else who speaks up in American politics.
We research their statements and then rate the accuracy on our Truth-O-Meter – True, Mostly True, Half
True, Mostly False and False. The most ridiculous falsehoods get our lowest rating, Pants on Fire.”).
3. Glenn Kessler, The Fact Checker: The Truth Behind the Rhetoric, Washington Post, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker (accessed Oct. 31, 2012).
4. See The Annenberg Public Policy Center, FactCheck.org, www.factcheck.org (accessed Oct.
31, 2012).
5. Glenn Kessler, 4 Pinnochios for Obama’s Newest Anti-Romney Ad, Washington Post, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/4-pinocchios-for-obamas-newest-anti-romney-ad/
2012/06/20/gJQAGuvx6qV_blog.html (June 21, 2012).
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claiming there was an “Obama plan” to weaken federal welfare law and
issue welfare checks to people who do not work.6
Romney’s campaign seemed to bear more of the brunt from the factchecking enterprise. Based solely upon Kessler’s subjective assessment of
truth, the Washington Post fact checker rated Romney ads and statements
with an average of 2.40 Pinocchios to Obama’s 2.11.7 Perhaps the greatest
media attack on the truthfulness of Romney’s campaign came in response to
the acceptance speech of Romney’s running-mate, Representative Paul
Ryan, which the New York Times described as containing “a number of
questionable or misleading claims.”8
Whether campaigns are resorting to lies and distortion more often than
in previous elections and, if so, why are interesting questions beyond that
which I can explore in this brief Article. False and misleading speech may
be increasing thanks to the proliferation of the internet and a decline in
uniform trustworthy sources of news, such as the national news networks
and major newspapers. Political polarization also may play a role, with
partisans egged on to believe unsupported claims by the modern day partisan press, in the form of FOX News, MSNBC, and liberal and conservative
blogs and websites.
Fact check operations also are controversial to journalists, who always
have been in the business of resolving conflicting factual claims as part of
the news gathering process. Some journalists take issue with the effectiveness of fact checkers. Media critic Jack Shafer declares, “Give [candidates]
a million billion Pinocchios and they’ll still not behave.”9 Others defend
the “fact check” process but see it losing its effectiveness.10
6. Glenn Kessler, Spin and Counterspin in the Welfare Debate, Washington Post, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/spin-and-counterspin-in-the-welfare-debate/2012/08/07/61
bf03b6-e0e3-11e1-8fc5-a7dcf1fc161d_blog.html (Aug. 8, 2012). The Obama campaign scored only 3
Pinocchios for arguing that “Romney sought the same sort of [welfare law] waiver authority when he
was governor, when there is little evidence that is the case.” Id.
7. Washington Post, Fact or Fiction?, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/
fact-checker-fact-or-fiction/ (statistics as of Nov. 18, 2012).
8. Cooper, supra n. 1 (“The cycle [of disregarding fact-checkers when one’s side is attacked] was
on display at the Republican convention when Mr. Romney’s running mate, Representative Paul D.
Ryan of Wisconsin, made a number of questionable or misleading claims in his speech. Even before he
stopped speaking, some of his claims were being questioned on Twitter. Soon fact-checkers were highlighting some of the misleading statements. More partisan sites rushed to Mr. Ryan’s defense with posts
finding fault with the first round of fact checks.”). See also Michael Cooper, Facts Take a Beating in
Acceptance Speeches, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/31/us/politics/ryans-speechcontained-a-litany-of-falsehoods.html (Aug. 31, 2012).
9. Jack Shafer, Looking for Truth in All the Wrong Places, Reuters, http://blogs.reuters.com/jack
shafer/2012/08/31/looking-for-truth-in-all-the-wrong-places/ (Aug. 31, 2012).
10. Dan Balz, President Obama, Mitt Romney Running a Most Poisonous Campaign, Washington
Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/a-most-poisonous-campaign/2012/08/15/16715a08-e6e711e1-8f62-58260e3940a0_story_1.html (Aug. 15, 2012) (“News organizations instituted fact-checking
and ad watches in reaction to earlier campaigns, when candidates were getting away with half-truths and
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In 2012, fact checking itself came under attack from the right, with
some advancing the claim that fact checkers are a biased part of the “liberal
media.”11 Conservatives disagreed, for example, that Romney made a false
statement about Obama’s welfare policies.12 Neil Newhouse, the Romney
campaign’s pollster, proclaimed that “[w]e’re not going to let our campaign
be dictated by fact-checkers.”13 Some Democrats viewed this as a statement that Republicans did not care about facts, while Republicans saw this
as a statement that the fact-checkers were biased. As this controversy
shows, in 2012 even statements about fact checking were subject to divergent interpretations.
In this highly charged partisan atmosphere, in which each side cannot
agree upon the basic facts, mudslinging has become terribly common, and
the media are not able to meaningfully curb candidates’ lies and distortions,
it is tempting to consider federal and state legislation to deter and punish
false campaign speech. Why not let courts or commissions sort out truth
from fiction? Indeed, a number of states already have laws in place that
provide some government sanction for false campaign speech.
Consider these recent alleged campaign lies: that a state supreme court
justice running for reelection let a child rapist go free;14 that a local candidate was taking bribes;15 that a judicial candidate who used to be a judge
but was no longer a judge was the incumbent;16 and that an assisted suicide
ballot measure would allow doctors to take people’s lives “without safeguards.”17
False campaign speech might trick voters into voting for the “wrong”
candidate or voting the “wrong” way on a ballot measure. (By “wrong,” I
worse, with little accountability. These have become robust and increasingly comprehensive. But they
are not providing much of a check on the campaigns’ behavior.”). See also Brendan Nyhan, Ignored
Fact Checks and the Media’s Crisis of Confidence, Columbia Journalism Review, http://www.cjr.org/
swing_states_project/ignored_factchecks_crisis_of_confidence.php?page=all (Aug. 30, 2012); and
Brendan Nyhan & Jason Riefler, When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political Misperceptions,
32 Political Behavior 303 (2010), http://www.springerlink.com/content/064786861r21m257/fulltext.
html (Mar. 30, 2010).
11. James Taranto, The “Pinocchio Press:” The Bizarre Rise of “Fact-Checking” Propagandists,
Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444301704577631470493495792.
html (Sept. 4, 2012); Fact Checking the Fact Checker (cont.), The Weekly Standard, http://www.weekly
standard.com/articles/fact-checking-fact-checkers-cont_652907.html (Oct. 1, 2012).
12. Mark Hemingway, Obama’s Palace Guard, Weekly Standard, http://www.weeklystandard.
com/articles/obama-s-palace-guard_652895.html (Oct. 1, 2012).
13. Cooper, supra n. 1.
14. Gerald G. Ashdown, Distorting Democracy: Campaign Lies in the 21st Century, 20 Wm. &
Mary Bill of Rts. J. 1085, 1085–1086 (2012).
15. McKimm v. Ohio Elections Commn., 729 N.E.2d 364 (Ohio 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1078
(2001).
16. Treas. of the Comm. to Elect Gerald D. Lostracco v. Fox, 389 N.W.2d 446 (Mich. 1986).
17. Wash. ex rel Pub. Disclosure Commn. v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 711 (Wash. 1998)
(Talmadge, J., concurring).
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mean that voters would be voting inconsistently with how they would vote
if they did not hear campaign lies.) Laws regulating false campaign speech
could assist voters to make informed decisions about which candidate or
ballot measure to support. Similarly, false election speech might trick voters into making a disenfranchising error, such as showing up at the wrong
place to vote. Laws barring false election speech, such as false statements
about where and when to vote, protect the right to vote and the integrity of
the electoral process.
But laws regulating false election and campaign speech raise a host of
potential problems, most importantly the possibility that these laws will be
the subject of manipulation by government authorities who want to favor
one side or the other in an election. The government also might make mistakes in ferreting out the truth and ironically lead voters to make wrong
decisions. Finally, we depend upon the campaigns themselves to allow voters to separate truth from lies and decide how to vote in line with voters’
preferences. Laws targeted at false campaign speech regulate political
speech at the core of the First Amendment and run the risk of doing more
harm than good. The key is to achieve an appropriate balance.
For many years, courts have divided on the constitutionality of laws
regulating false campaign speech, with some courts upholding some false
campaign speech laws and other courts striking them down. This past June,
however, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in U.S. v. Alvarez,18 a case
which no doubt will cause courts to reconsider the constitutionality of such
laws. Although Alvarez did not involve campaign speech, the Supreme
Court discussed the general question whether the Constitution protects
knowing lies in the context of a federal law barring false statements about
military honors. The Court issued no majority opinion, but all of the opinions had something to say about laws regulating false speech generally, and
Justice Breyer’s opinion (for himself and Justice Kagan) cast serious doubt
on the constitutionality of many laws regulating false campaign (and possibly false election) speech. The result of Alvarez is that laws regulating false
campaign speech are in even more constitutional trouble than they were
before, and any attempts to regulate such speech will have to be narrow,
targeted, and careful in their choice of remedies.
Part II of this Article briefly describes the pre-Alvarez split in the
lower courts on the regulation of false campaign and election speech and
the arguments that had been advanced for and against the constitutionality
of regulating false campaign speech. Part III describes the Supreme Court’s
fractured opinion in U.S. v. Alvarez. Part IV discusses how Alvarez may
affect the constitutional calculus in the false campaign speech arena and
18. U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012), discussed infra pt. III.
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argues that, in light of Alvarez, courts should hold unconstitutional most
broad state laws barring false speech in campaigns. But courts should reject
challenges to narrower laws that, under an actual malice/clear and convincing evidence standard, (1) bar false (though not misleading) election speech
about the mechanics of voting, such as false statements about the date and
time of voting; (2) give a government election authority the power to reject
false campaign speech submitted for official ballot materials; and (3) allow
a jury to punish defamatory speech about candidates made with actual malice. Each of these proposed laws is consistent with the plurality’s and Justice Breyer’s opinions in Alvarez, although the defamation issue is somewhat in question.
The hardest case is whether the government has authority to enjoin or
punish non-defamatory false campaign speech made with knowledge of falsity (actual malice) that has the potential to trick or defraud voters into
changing their votes. Consider, for example, the false statement of a judicial candidate on a campaign poster that she is an incumbent judge, or a
statement that the president has endorsed her for office. While the case is
close, I argue that, following Alvarez, courts are likely to conclude that the
risks of allowing the government to punish or enjoin false campaign speech
outweigh the benefits of providing voters with truthful information. Further, the narrower solution to the problem of this type of false campaign
speech is counterspeech from opposing candidates and the media, as well as
potentially the use of a government “truth commission” with the power to
declare, before the election but subject to judicial review, that campaign
speech is false.
Government proclamations of truth, like journalistic fact checks, might
be ignored or attacked by the campaigns. But such proclamations will focus voter attention on the issue of the veracity of questionable campaign
speech. Under the First Amendment, we have to trust voters to do their best
with such information. Truth commissions pose risks as well as harms, and
it may be that counterspeech is the best we can do consistent with the First
Amendment and the risks of the alternatives.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF FALSE CAMPAIGN SPEECH LAWS
BEFORE U.S. V. ALVAREZ
This Part briefly reviews some of the major cases considering the constitutionality of laws regulating false campaign speech. The section is brief
because others have covered this ground very well in great detail19 and any
19. See e.g. Ashdown, supra n. 14; William P. Marshall, False Campaign Speech and the First
Amendment, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 285 (2004); Becky Kruse, Student Author, The Truth in Masquerade:
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new analysis of these issues will have to take into account the Supreme
Court’s new decision in U.S. v. Alvarez.
The Supreme Court has not spoken directly on the constitutionality of
laws barring false campaign speech. The closest the Court has come to the
issue is the case of Brown v. Hartlage,20 in which the Court rejected an
attempt to declare an election result void after the election winner was accused of violating a Kentucky law that barred a candidate from certain corrupt practices.21 The candidate had promised not to take a salary if elected,
and Kentucky courts had earlier held that promises not to take a salary
violated the statute and could be grounds for voiding the election.22
The Supreme Court explained, “When a State seeks to restrict directly
the offer of ideas by a candidate to the voters, the First Amendment surely
requires that the restriction be demonstrably supported by not only a legitimate state interest, but a compelling one, and that the restriction operate
without unnecessarily circumscribing protected expression.”23 It held that
applying this law to the candidate’s statement and voiding his election violated the First Amendment for three reasons.
First, the Court held that Kentucky could not penalize general comments like this one made in a campaign: “a candidate’s promise to confer
some ultimate benefit on the voter, qua taxpayers, citizen, or member of the
general public, does not lie beyond the pale of First Amendment protection.”24 Second, the Court rejected the idea that Kentucky could impose
such a law on grounds that “emphasis on free public service might result in
persons of independent wealth but less ability being chosen over those who,
though better qualified, could not afford to serve at a reduced salary.”25
Third, although the Court agreed that “demonstrable falsehoods are not protected by the First Amendment in the same manner as truthful statements,”26 there was no evidence in this case that the candidate made the
statement in anything other than good faith. He also withdrew the statement after learning it could violate state law.27
This statement in Brown about lesser protection for false speech,
which the Supreme Court analogized to its treatment of defamation law,
gave some credence to the idea that states could regulate false campaign
Regulating False Ballot Proposition Ads through State Anti-False Speech Statutes, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 129
(2001); Carlton F.W. Larson, Student Author, Bearing False Witness, 108 Yale L.J. 1155 (1999).
20. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982).
21. Id. at 62.
22. Id. at 47–48.
23. Id. at 53–54.
24. Id. at 58–59.
25. Id. at 59–60.
26. Brown, 456 U.S. at 60.
27. Id. at 61–62.
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speech. On the other hand, the rest of the Court’s opinion extolled the virtues of free and robust campaign speech, in which candidates could engage
in unfettered discussion of political issues. Perhaps unsurprisingly, courts
since Brown had divided on the constitutionality of regulating false campaign speech.
In Washington ex rel. Public Disclosure Commission v. 119 Vote No!
Committee,28 the Supreme Court of the state of Washington divided sharply
on the constitutionality of a law barring any person from sponsoring with
“actual malice” a political advertisement containing a false statement of
material fact. The statement would have to be material, and proof of a
violation required “clear and convincing evidence.” The term “actual malice” means that the statement was made either with knowledge of its falsity
or reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity.29
The case arose out of a claim that opponents of a ballot measure concerning assisted suicide made false claims about what the ballot measure
would do, including that the measure would allow doctors to take patients’
lives “without safeguards.” The Washington State Public Disclosure Commission referred the complaint to prosecutors, asking that the Committee
and individual defendants be fined up to $10,000 plus costs, attorney fees,
and treble damages. The trial court held that the advertisement criticizing
the ballot measure did not contain material false statements. The intervener, the American Civil Liberties Union, sought a declaration that the
statute was invalid. The trial court denied the relief, holding the statute
constitutional.30
On appeal, the state Supreme Court divided bitterly, issuing four opinions. Justice Sanders, speaking for himself and two other Justices, held that
the law violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution,
which protects freedom of speech. Justice Sanders stressed that the First
Amendment has its “fullest and most urgent application” in political campaigns.31 He rejected the idea that the State has “an independent right to
determine truth and falsity in political debate.”32 Even the high standard of
proof contained in the statute would not prevent “the chilling effect of possible government sanction.”33 Justice Sanders recognized that the state may
have an interest in punishing malicious defamatory speech about a candidate but held the law went more broadly than simply targeting such defamatory speech. “Ultimately, the State’s claimed compelling interest to shield
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691.
Id. at 703 (Talmadge, J., concurring).
Id. at 693–694 (majority).
Id. at 694 (quoting Brown, 456 U.S. at 53).
Id. at 695.
Id. at 696.
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the public from falsehoods during a political campaign is patronizing and
paternalistic . . . . It assumes the people of the state are too ignorant or
disinterested to investigate, learn and determine for themselves the truth or
falsity in political debate, and it is the proper role of the government itself
to fill this void.”34
Justice Madsen, speaking for herself and one other Justice, agreed with
the majority that the Constitution forbids laws punishing false speech concerning ballot measures, which the Justice saw as pure political speech. But
relying upon U.S. Supreme Court cases holding it constitutional to award
damages for defamatory statements made about public officials with actual
malice, Justice Madsen concluded there was no constitutional impediment
to broader laws covering false campaign speech concerning candidates.35
Justice Guy, speaking for himself and one other Justice, agreed that the
advertisement at issue in the case did not violate the statute but disagreed
strongly about the constitutionality of the Washington law on its face.
“Calculated lies are not protected political speech. The elected representatives of the people have the right to pass laws which make malicious lying
illegal in political campaigns; we have no constitutional duty to strike down
such laws.”36
Justice Talmadge, speaking for himself and one other Justice, issued a
blistering opinion concurring in the judgment but disagreeing with the court
on the constitutionality of the statute. Calling the Court “the first Court in
the history of the Republic to declare First Amendment protection for calculated lies,”37 he criticized the “sweep” of the majority’s “encompassing”
rhetoric. He accused the majority of being “shockingly oblivious to the
increasing nastiness of modern American political campaigns” with their
“‘win-at-any-cost’ attitude involving vilification of opponents and their
ideas.”38 Justice Talmadge rejected the argument that the statute would
chill political speech, saying it would only stop “malicious prevarication,
not honest, robust political debate.”39 Relying on a number of Supreme
Court and Washington state precedents, Justice Talmadge concluded that
the First Amendment did not protect maliciously false statements. He concluded the state had a compelling interest in preserving the “sanctity of the
electoral process.”40 He agreed with the majority only on the point that the
trial court was correct in concluding that the challenged statement did not
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d at 698–699.
Id. at 700 (Madsen, J., concurring).
Id. at 699 (Guy, J., concurring).
Id. at 701 (Talmadge, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 701–702.
119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d at 707–708.
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involve a deliberate lie, but instead contained “traditional political hyperbole.”41
The Washington Supreme Court divided once again on the question of
the constitutionality of laws barring false campaign speech in the 2007 case
Rickert v. Washington Public Disclosure Commission.42 In light of the 119
Vote No! case, the Washington legislature had modified the statute to cover
only false statements about a candidate in a campaign, but not false statements a candidate made about herself. In this case, unlike 119 Vote No!,
there seemed no question that someone, in this case a candidate, made a
deliberately false statement. The candidate claimed that her opponent, an
incumbent state Senator, voted to close a facility for the developmentally
disabled.43
Four Justices wrote an opinion holding that the statute failed to survive
strict scrutiny analysis under the First Amendment. Aside from the same
arguments made by the plurality in the 119 Vote No! case, the majority
found this statute not narrowly tailored because it did not cover false statements made by a candidate about himself or herself. The remedy for the
false speech was more speech:
In the case at bar, Ms. Rickert made knowingly false or reckless statements
about Senator Sheldon, a man with an outstanding reputation. Senator Sheldon and his (many) supporters responded to Ms. Rickert’s false statements
with the truth. As a consequence, Ms. Rickert’s statements appear to have
had little negative impact on Senator Sheldon’s successful campaign and may
even have increased his vote.44

Four Justices, in an opinion by Justice Madsen reiterating the points in
her earlier 119 Vote No! opinion, dissented, stating that the Constitution
gave the state of Washington the right to punish false campaign speech
aimed at candidates.45 Chief Justice Alexander, writing only for himself in
a controlling opinion, held in a single-paragraph concurrence that the new
false political speech law was unconstitutional because it covered non-defamatory false statements about candidates. But Justice Alexander stated
that a law aimed solely at defamatory false political speech would be constitutional.46
False campaign speech laws fared somewhat better in Ohio. In Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Commission,47 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit upheld a portion of Ohio’s law allowing a state board
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 710.
Rickert v. Wash. Pub. Disclosure Commn., 168 P.3d 826 (Wash. 2007).
Id. at 827.
Id. at 832.
Id. at 833 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
Id. at 833 (Alexander, C.J., concurring).
Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Commn., 926 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1991).
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to reprimand candidates for false campaign speech statements made with
actual malice but struck down provisions allowing the board to impose fines
and cease and desist orders. “[Supreme Court] cases indicate that false
speech, even political speech, does not merit constitutional protection if the
speaker knows of the falsehood or recklessly disregards the truth.”48 But
the fines were being imposed by a commission and not a court, without any
guarantee that the commission would use a “clear and convincing” evidence
standard. The cease and desist orders were an unconstitutional prior restraint of speech.49
The court upheld the “truth declaring” reprimand function of the Commission:
What is happening in this case, with regard to the ‘truth declaring’ function of
the Commission, is that the Commission is making judgments, and publicly
announcing those judgments to the world, as to the truth or falsity of the
actions and statements of candidates and others intimately involved in the
political process. These activities are closely comparable to those now carried
on by many agencies of government.50

Following Pestrak, the Ohio Supreme Court in McKimm v. Ohio Elections Commission51 upheld the reprimand of a candidate who published a
cartoon depicting his opposing candidate holding a bundle of cash underneath a table along with accompanying words that the court held connoted
to the reasonable reader that the candidate had taken a bribe or kickback.52
Most recently, in 281 Care Committee v. Arneson,53 the Eighth Circuit
rejected a number of procedural arguments against a challenge to a Minnesota law that made it a crime to engage in false campaign speech with actual malice. Three groups opposed to school board funding initiatives
sought a declaration striking down the Minnesota law after a number of the
groups’ opponents allegedly threatened litigation under the statute for allegedly false statements the groups made in earlier campaigns.54
The court rejected the argument that false speech was entitled to no
constitutional protection under the First Amendment, and it held that false
campaign speech was quintessential political speech at the core of the First
Amendment:
We do not, of course, hold today that a state may never regulate false speech
in this context. Rather, we hold that it may only do so when it satisfies the
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 577.
Id. at 578.
Id. at 579.
McKimm, 729 N.E.2d 364.
Id. at 366.
281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 61 (2012).
Id. at 625–626.
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First Amendment test required for content-based speech restrictions: that any
regulation be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government interest.55

It remanded the case for a consideration of whether the Minnesota law satisfied strict scrutiny.56 After deciding U.S. v. Alvarez, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari in the 281 Care Committee case, leaving open the possibility that the case could return to the Supreme Court after further proceedings
in the lower courts.
What to make of these cases? First, the judges hearing these cases
seem to agree that any law regulating false campaign speech must—at the
very least—be targeted at speech made with actual malice57 and probably
be decided under a heightened evidentiary standard, such as a clear and
convincing evidence standard. Prior restraints—or injunctions barring false
statements—appear to be off the table. Beyond that, the judges have disagreed on whether false speech generally is entitled to any protection and, if
it is, how to strike the First Amendment balance. Further, the kinds of cases
that come before the judges are anything but clear-cut on the facts; it may
be hard to tell fact from opinion and to know when innuendo is close
enough to a lie to count under a state’s false campaign speech statute.
The clear message from the collection of cases seems to be that there
are important interests on both sides of the equation and that judges and
others have struck the balance differently. Professor Bill Marshall canvassed the area, identifying four arguments in favor of laws regulating false
campaign speech. “First, and most obviously, false statements can distort
the electoral process.”58 “Second, false statements can serve to lower the
quality of campaign discourse and debate.”59 “Third, false statements can
lead or add to voter alienation by fostering voter cynicism and distrust of
the political process.”60 “Fourth, false statements against an opponent’s
character can inflict reputational and emotional injury upon the attacked
individual.”61
Professor Marshall also identified four arguments against enactment of
false campaign laws. “First, as an introductory matter, the arguments in
favor of regulation may overstate the harms. For example, the regulatory
55. Id. at 636.
56. Id.
57. See e.g. Ancheta v. Watada, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1122 (D. Haw. 2001). But see Lee
Goldman, False Campaign Advertising and the Actual Malice Standard, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 889 (2008)
(arguing instead for liability under a “negligence” standard for false campaign speech).
58. Marshall, supra n. 19, at 294. Marshall based his anti-distortion arguments on a line of campaign finance cases that have since been overturned by the Supreme Court in Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Commn., 129 S. Ct. 2893 (2009). But see Ashdown, supra n. 14, at 1104–1111 (arguing that
anti-distortion interest survives Citizens United).
59. Marshall, supra n. 19, at 294.
60. Id. at 295.
61. Id. at 296.
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concern of preventing candidates from deceiving voters may miss the point
that voters often do not believe what they hear in campaigns anyway.”62
“Second and more importantly, restricting campaign speech, including even
false campaign speech, is in tension with basic free speech principles. The
discussion of political affairs lies at the heart of the First Amendment.”63
“Third, authorizing the government to decide what is true or false in campaign speech opens the door to partisan abuse.”64 “Fourth, regulating campaign speech is problematic because it allows the courts and/or other regulatory bodies to be used as political weapons.”65
With strong arguments on both sides, it is no surprise that courts had
divided on the constitutionality of false campaign speech laws. As we shall
see, however, last June in U.S. v. Alvarez the Supreme Court put a thumb on
the First Amendment side of the scales, making it much harder to sustain
the constitutionality of many false campaign speech laws in the future.
III. A QUICK REVIEW

OF

U.S. V. ALVAREZ

While some of the false campaign speech cases described in the last
Part raise debatable questions about whether a statement really was a false
statement of fact, falsity was not in question when it came to Defendant
Xavier Alvarez’s lie about winning the Congressional Medal of Honor. As
Justice Kennedy explained in the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in U.S.
v. Alvarez: “Lying was his habit. [Alvarez] lied when he said that he played
hockey for the Detroit Red Wings and that he once married a starlet from
Mexico. But when he lied in announcing he held the Congressional Medal
of Honor, [Alvarez] ventured onto new ground; for that lie violates a federal
criminal statute, the Stolen Valor Act of 2005.”66 Justice Kennedy described Alvarez’s statement:
In 2007, [Alvarez] attended his first public meeting as a board member of the
Three Valley Water Board District. . . . He introduced himself as follows:
‘I’m a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I
was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. I got wounded many times
by the same guy.’ None of this was true. For all the record shows, respondent’s statements were a pathetic attempt to gain respect that eluded him. The
statements do not seem to have been made to secure employment or financial
benefits or admission to privileges reserved for those who had earned the
Medal.67
62. Id. at 297.
63. Id. at 298.
64. Id. at 299.
65. Marshall, supra n. 19, at 300.
66. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2542 (plurality opinion). Citing 18 U.S.C. § 704, Justice Kennedy noted
that “Respondent’s claim to hold the Congressional Medal of Honor was false. There is no room to
argue about interpretation or shades of meaning.” Id. at 2543.
67. Id. at 2542 (citation omitted).
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The Ninth Circuit held that the Stolen Valor Act violated the First Amendment, but the Tenth Circuit, in a separate case, upheld it.68 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve the split. But the Court split badly in its
decision, 4–3–2, issuing no majority opinion.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for four Justices rejected the argument that
the First Amendment categorically did not protect false statements, the way
the First Amendment categorically does not protect other types of speech,
such as obscenity and fighting words. “This comports with the common
understanding that some false statements are inevitable if there is to be an
open and vigorous expression of views in public and private conversation,
expression the First Amendment seeks to guarantee.”69
Justice Kennedy’s opinion distinguished cases upholding liability for
fraud or defamation against First Amendment challenge, as well as laws
prohibiting false statements to the government. As to fraud and defamation,
Justice Kennedy stressed that the Court on First Amendment grounds had
imposed additional important limits on liability, including the actual malice
standard.70 As to false speech made to the government, and laws that prohibit impersonating a government officer, Justice Kennedy said these laws
“protect the integrity of Government processes, quite apart from merely restricting false speech.”71 Laws barring false testimony under oath were justified on a similar basis.72
Justice Kennedy declared that the Stolen Valor Act did not implicate
the interests at issue in these other kinds of cases. It barred false speech
which was not made “to effect a fraud or secure money or other valuable
considerations, say offers of employment.”73 The law also was quite
broad;74 the Court held it was not narrowly tailored to protect the “integrity
of the military honors system.”75 “There must be a direct causal link between the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.”76 “The Government has not shown, and cannot show, why counterspeech would not
68. Id. at 2542 (citing U.S. v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2010), 638 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 2011)
(seven Ninth Circuit judges dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), and U.S. v. Strandlof, 667 F.3d
1146 (10th Cir. 2012)).
69. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544–2545 (rejecting the government’s reliance on earlier cases that
appeared to hold to the contrary).
70. Id. at 2545.
71. Id. at 2546.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2547–2548.
74. Id. at 2547 (“The statute seeks to control and suppress all false statements on this one subject in
almost limitless times and settings. And it does so entirely without regard to whether the lie was made
for the purpose of material gain.”).
75. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2549.
76. Id.
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suffice to achieve its interest.”77 Justice Kennedy suggested that public ridicule might be enough, as well as the government creating a database of
medal recipients.78
Justice Breyer, writing for himself and Justice Kagan, rejected the plurality’s “strict categorical analysis.”79 Instead, Justice Breyer said that in
evaluating a law barring false speech it was necessary to engage in balancing, taking into account:
the seriousness of the speech-related harm the provision will likely cause, the
nature and importance of the provision’s countervailing objectives, the extent
to which the provision will tend to achieve these objectives, and whether there
are other, less restrictive ways of doing so. Ultimately, the Court has had to
determine whether the statute works speech-related harm that is out of proportion to its justifications.80

Justice Breyer then applied what he termed “intermediate scrutiny” to
determine whether the Stolen Valor Act was constitutional. He agreed with
the three dissenting Justices that “there are broad areas in which any attempt by the state to penalize purportedly false speech would present a
grave and unacceptable danger of suppressing truthful speech.”81 He
pointed to laws “restricting false statements about philosophy, religion, history, the social sciences, [and] the arts.”82 He stated that the danger is
lower when the regulations “concern false statements about easily verifiable
facts that do not concern such subject matter.”83 Further “[f]alse factual
statements can serve useful human objectives.”84
Like the plurality, Justice Breyer stressed that laws regulating some
false speech are narrower and tend to require “proof of specific harm to
identifiable victims.”85 Fraud statutes require proof of materiality, defamation focuses on statements which are likely to harm reputation, perjury focuses on materiality and a subset of statements made under oath.86 Statutes
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2550–2551.
79. Id. at 2551 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
80. Id. at 2551–2552.
81. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551–2552 (quoting dissent at 2564). But Justice Breyer never directly
explains why he fails to apply strict scrutiny to a content-based restriction.
82. Id. at 2552.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2553 (“False factual statements can serve useful human objectives, for example: in social
contexts, where they may prevent embarrassment, protect privacy, shield a person from prejudice, provide the sick with comfort, or preserve a child’s innocence; in public contexts, where they may stop a
panic or otherwise preserve calm in the face of danger; and even in technical, philosophical, and scientific contexts, where (as Socrates’ methods suggest) examination of a false statement (even if made
deliberately to mislead) can promote a form of thought that ultimately helps realize the truth.”).
85. Id. 2554.
86. Id.
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prohibiting lying to the government are limited to “particular and specific
harm by interfering with the functioning of a government department.”87
Justice Breyer then turned to the statute at hand. He found its breadth
fatal: “As written, it applies in family, social or other private contexts,
where lies will often cause little harm. It also applies in political contexts
where although such lies are likely to cause harm, the risk of censorious
selectivity by prosecutors is also high.”88 He suggested a “more finely tailored statute,” perhaps aimed at only a subset of military awards, might be
constitutional.89
Justice Breyer then added the following paragraph, which is most pertinent to the issue in this Article:
I recognize that in some contexts, particularly political contexts, such a narrowing will not always be easy to achieve. In the political arena a false statement is more likely to make a behavioral difference (say, by leading the listeners to vote for the speaker) but at the same time criminal prosecution is
particularly dangerous (say, by radically changing a potential election result)
and consequently can more easily result in censorship of speakers and their
ideas. Thus, the statute may have to be significantly narrowed in its applications. Some lower courts have upheld the constitutionality of roughly comparable but narrowly tailored statutes in political contexts. See, e.g., United We
Stand America, Inc. v. United We Stand, America New York, Inc., 128 F.3d
86, 93 (C.A.2 1997) (upholding against First Amendment challenge application of Lanham Act to a political organization); Treasurer of the Committee to
Elect Gerald D. Lostracco v. Fox, 150 Mich. App. 617, 389 N.W.2d 446
(1986) (upholding under First Amendment statute prohibiting campaign material falsely claiming that one is an incumbent). Without expressing any view
on the validity of those cases, I would also note, like the plurality, that in this
area more accurate information will normally counteract the lie. And an accurate, publicly available register of military awards, easily obtainable by political opponents, may well adequately protect the integrity of an award against
those who would falsely claim to have earned it. And so it is likely that a
more narrowly tailored statute combined with such information-disseminating
devices will effectively serve Congress’ end.90

Justice Alito, for the three dissenters, voted to uphold the Stolen Valor
Act’s constitutionality. He wrote that laws prohibiting false statements
have “no intrinsic First Amendment value”91 and that “[l]aws prohibiting
fraud, perjury and defamation . . . were in existence when the First Amendment was adopted, and their constitutionality is beyond question.”92 Justice
Alito cited these laws as well as laws barring false statements to govern87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2554.
Id. at 2555.
Id. at 2555–2556.
Id. at 2556 (citation omitted).
Id. at 2560 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2561.
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ment officials as consistent with the general right of the government to punish false speech about military honors. Justice Alito rejected the idea that
the law was overbroad and criticized both the plurality opinion and Justice
Breyer’s opinion for failing to offer any meaningful way that the statute
might be narrowed.93
Importantly for our purposes, the dissenters talked about the circumstances under which laws barring false speech could create an unconstitutional chill. When it comes to matters of public concern, Justice Alito explained, the First Amendment required the Court to impose the actual malice requirement on defamation claims and tort claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.94 Justice Alito also relied upon that part of
Brown v. Hartlage,95 in which the Supreme Court rejected the voiding of an
election based upon a statement where there was no proof of actual malice.96 He stated:
These examples by no means exhaust the circumstances in which false factual
statements enjoy a degree of instrumental constitutional protection. On the
contrary, there are broad areas in which any attempt by the state to penalize
purportedly false speech would present a grave and unacceptable danger of
suppressing truthful speech. Laws restricting false statements about philosophy, religion, history, the social sciences, the arts, and other matters of public
concern would present such a threat. The point is not that there is no such
thing as truth or falsity in these areas or that the truth is always impossible to
ascertain, but rather that it is perilous to permit the state to be the arbiter of
truth . . . .
Allowing the state to proscribe false statements in these areas also opens the
door for the state to use its power for political ends. Statements about history
illustrate this point. If some false statements about historical events may be
banned, how certain must it be that a statement is false before the ban may be
upheld? And who should make that calculation? While our cases prohibiting
viewpoint discrimination would fetter the state’s power to some degree, see
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384–390, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305
(1992) (explaining that the First Amendment does not permit the government
to engage in viewpoint discrimination under the guise of regulating unprotected speech), the potential for abuse of power in these areas is simply too
great.97

Concluding that the Stolen Valor Act had no potential to create such a chill,
Justice Alito would have upheld the Act and the instant prosecution.98
93. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2565. The dissenters also claimed the government did not have the
information to create an accurate database of medal holders.
94. Id. at 2563.
95. Brown, 456 U.S. at 61–62.
96. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2563 (Alito, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 2564.
98. Id.
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AND

The Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. v. Alvarez no doubt will be the
central case in future court proceedings considering First Amendment challenges to false campaign and election speech laws. Gone is the argument,
accepted by some courts before Alvarez, that false speech (including false
campaign or election speech) is entitled to no constitutional protection and
in a category with obscenity and fighting words. In its place is a regime in
which broad laws targeting false speech stand little chance of being upheld
regardless of the topic. A court undoubtedly would strike down a broad
statute prohibiting false campaign statements made in any place and at any
time.
Although the Court’s decision in Alvarez is badly fractured, there
seems unanimous skepticism of laws targeting false speech about issues of
public concern and through which the state potentially could use its sanctioning power for political ends. Especially dangerous are criminal laws
punishing false speech that could lead to selective criminal prosecution.
Thus, at the very least it seems that to survive constitutional review, any
false campaign speech law would have to be narrow, targeted only at false
speech made with actual malice, and likely proven under an elevated level
of proof, such as clear and convincing evidence. Although not directly discussed in Alvarez, the Court would be unlikely to accept any law which
allowed an injunction to bar the utterance of false campaign speech, viewing that as an unconstitutional prior restraint of speech.
Beyond these points, it is much harder to determine how the Court
would address specific laws targeting false campaign speech. Justice
Breyer’s opinion in particular noted both the significant harm of false campaign speech (leading voters to make the wrong decision) as well as the
dangers of campaign speech laws, including selective prosecution motivated for political reasons and government censorship.
Justice Breyer cited two false campaign speech cases. In one case, a
court upheld a trademark infringement case against the offshoot of 1992
Presidential candidate Ross Perot’s “United We Stand” group. Donors confused by the similar names might have donated to the wrong political
group.99 In the other case, a court upheld a First Amendment challenge to a
law barring someone from misrepresenting himself as an incumbent
judge.100 The candidate had previously served as a judge, and campaigned
99. Id. at 2556 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (citing United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We
Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 93 (2d Cir. 1997)).
100. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2556 (citing Treas. of the Comm. to Elect Gerald D. Lostracco, 389
N.W.2d at 449).
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using phrases such as “Elect Judge Bruce A. Fox to Circuit Court.” After
citing these cases, Justice Breyer then cast doubt upon them by stating:
“Without expressing any view on the validity of those cases, I would also
note, like the plurality, that in this area more accurate information will normally counteract the lie.”101
While the other Justices did not speak as directly on the issue of false
campaign speech, it would not be surprising to find all of the Justices agreeing with Justice Breyer on this point—both the plurality, which applied a
strict approach to considering the constitutionality of laws barring false
campaign speech, and the dissenters, who expressed doubts about false
speech laws aimed at matters of public concern in which laws barring false
speech could chill legitimate and protected speech.
But deciding exactly where to draw the line between permissible and
impermissible laws aimed at false campaign and election speech is hard.
Right after the Court’s decision in Alvarez, First Amendment scholar Eugene Volokh wrote of his uncertainty. He opined that some laws targeting
false campaign speech by a candidate might be upheld because they involve
candidates using a falsehood to get a job, and therefore in a sense they are
“closer to financial fraud.” Further, he wrote that the government’s interest
in preventing voter deception is “quite strong,” likely to pass Justice
Breyer’s “intermediate scrutiny test,” although he noted that Justice Breyer
also expressed concern about selective prosecutions.102
Professor Volokh added:
My guess is that general bans on lies in election campaigns would be struck
down, because they cover a wide range of territory in which the truth may be
hard to uncover, and in some measure in the eye of the beholder. But narrower bans on, say, knowingly false statements about when or where people
should vote, knowingly false claims that some person or organization has endorsed you, knowingly false claims that you are the incumbent (see, e.g.,
Treasurer of the Committee to Elect Gerald D. Lostracco v. Fox, 389 N.W.2d
446 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)), knowingly false claims about your own job experience—including military experience—and the like might be constitutional.
It’s just hard to tell, given both the limited scope of the opinions and the 4-2-3
split.103

I agree with part, although not all, of Professor Volokh’s analysis, as
will be clear from my analysis below of four types of election-related false
101. Id.
102. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Knowing Falsehoods, The Volokh Conspiracy, http://
www.volokh.com/2012/06/28/freedom-of-speech-and-knowing-falsehoods/ (June 28, 2012). Professor
Volokh also co-wrote an amicus brief in the Alvarez case arguing that false speech is not deserving of
constitutional protection. See Br. of Profs. Eugene Volokh & James Weinstein as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petr., U.S. v. Alvarez, 2011 WL 6179424, also available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs/11-210_petitioneramcu2profs.authcheck
dam.pdf.
103. Volokh, supra n. 102.
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speech laws. For each type, I assume that a state (or Congress) has imposed
in its law an actual malice requirement and required proof by a heightened
evidentiary standard, such as clear and convincing evidence.
A. Laws Barring False (But Not Deceptive) Election Speech
The strongest case for constitutionality is a narrow law targeted at false
election speech aimed at disenfranchising voters. While a senator, President Obama introduced just such a bill, the Deceptive Practices and Voter
Intimidation Act of 2007.104 Consider the false statement that “Republicans
vote on Tuesday, Democrats vote on Wednesday.” A state should have the
power to criminalize such speech. The law would be justified by the government’s compelling interest in protecting the right to vote. Such speech,
which could be distributed in the days before the election, could be very
difficult to counter with truthful speech about election rules. Following the
Alvarez dissenters, there is no conceivable chill of legitimate speech that
such a law would deter.105 The risk of selective prosecution for false election speech seems relatively low, and the falsity of such speech would be
easily verifiable. Courts are likely to uphold narrowly drawn false campaign speech laws.
Along similar lines, a state should be able to stop a person from falsely
representing identity in an election context with the aim of defrauding donors of their money. For example, a group cannot falsely claim it is raising
money for a candidate’s campaign but then use the money for a different
purpose.106 Falsely representing yourself as a representative of a candidate,
party or committee for financial gain seems well within the type of antifinancial fraud law that it appears all on the Court accept as constitutionally
permissible.
In contrast, a law targeted at “deceptive” or “misleading” election
speech would face greater constitutional hurdles, in part because such a law
could chill legitimate speech given the elasticity of the terms “deceptive”

104. Sen. 453, 110th Cong., 1st session, available at http://www.opencongress.org/bill/110-s453/text
(Jan. 31, 2007). The bill also targeted false endorsements, an issue I return to below. On the topic of
false and deceptive election speech, see Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Voter Fraud or Voter Defrauded?
Highlighting an Inconsistent Consideration of Election Fraud, 44 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Liberties L.
Rev. 1 (2009) and Gilda R. Daniels, Voter Deception, 43 Ind. L. Rev. 343 (2010).
105. Of course, anyone who negligently gave incorrect information about the casting of a ballot
would not be subject to liability thanks to the actual malice requirement.
106. See Shane Goldmacher, Look-Alike Sites Funnel Big Money to Mystery PAC, National Journal,
http://www.nationaljournal.com/daily/look-alike-sites-funnel-big-money-to-mystery-pac-20120909?
page=1 (Sept. 11, 2012).
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and “misleading.”107 Consider, for example, a statement such as “bring
identification with you to the polls” made in a state that does not have a
voter identification requirement. While such speech could be misleading,
suggesting to some voters that identification is required and perhaps deterring voters without the right i.d. from voting, what counts as “misleading”
is unconstitutionally vague and in the eyes of the beholder. A statute aimed
at barring such misleading speech would open up prosecutorial discretion
and the potential for political gamesmanship beyond that which the courts
likely would tolerate.
Some cases will no doubt be close to the line. Consider this poster
circulated in student dorms at the University of Wisconsin:108

Election flyer, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 2004
107. Despite the name of Obama’s bill, see supra n. 104, it targeted only knowingly false statements
made with the intent to prevent someone from exercising the right to vote in an election and not merely
“deceptive” speech.
108. The flyer is reprinted in Richard L. Hasen, The Voting Wars: From Florida 2000 to the Next
Election Meltdown 94 (Yale Univ. Press 2012).
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A vote in the wrong precinct would be a vote cast via a provisional ballot,
which would not count. Is the statement “vote at the polling place of your
choice” literally false, or only misleading? It might be literally false because one cannot “vote” a ballot that will count (one can cast a provisional
ballot that will not count) at the wrong polling place. Or the statement
merely might be misleading because it does not describe the consequences
of voting in the polling place of one’s choice.
B. Laws Allowing the Government to Reject False Campaign Speech in
Official Ballot Materials from the State
Even if, as I suggest below, the state might be powerless to stop a
candidate from falsely claiming to be an incumbent or from having received
the endorsement from someone else, the state is not required to print ballot
materials that contain false statements. In Alvarez, all of the Justices agreed
that laws barring false statements made to the government were constitutional. Such laws ensure that government processes continue and that the
government provides accurate information to the public. The government
has its own interest in assuring the accuracy of information it issues. For
example, when the state allows candidates to list a profession on the ballot,
the state should have the authority to vet those statements and to reject false
statements. Further, the Court in Alvarez indicated that laws barring false
speech to the government are constitutional, and providing false information for purposes of government election materials should be no different.
To be sure, giving the government this power does create a risk of
censorship and political manipulation that does not seem present in laws
outlawing false election speech. However, the possibility of pre-election
judicial review, as is common with fights over the accuracy of ballot materials submitted in California, assures that a judge protective of the First
Amendment will have ultimate control over any state decision to reject
campaign speech as false.
C. Laws Barring Defamatory Campaign Speech
All of the Justices in Alvarez agree that general laws punishing defamation survive the First Amendment, provided they meet the heightened
First Amendment rules created by the Supreme Court, such as the actual
malice requirement. The question is whether defamatory statements made
in the context of a campaign might be treated differently and be unconstitutional despite the general constitutionality of defamation laws otherwise
meeting Supreme Court standards.
Courts are likely, but by no means certain, to uphold the constitutionality of defamation laws used in the context of political campaigns. On the
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one hand, candidates like anyone else should have the right to a reputation
not ruined through malicious lies. Further, post-election civil damage suits
for defamation do not present the risk of selective prosecution, which might
come in pre-election civil actions. On the other hand, the law of defamation
could have some chilling effect on robust debate during intense election
periods. Further, as the saying goes, “politics ain’t beanbag.” Anyone running for office today in the rough-and-tumble world of politics perhaps assumes the risk of being defamed or at least regularly insulted. It would be
unsurprising if courts go further and bar even defamation suits arising out
of statements made in candidate elections.
D. Laws Regulating False Public Statements about Candidates
or Ballot Measures
The hardest case under Alvarez is whether the government has authority to enjoin or punish non-defamatory malicious false campaign speech,
such as a statement by a candidate that she is the incumbent or has been
endorsed by the President. Professor Volokh wrote that such laws as applied to candidates might be constitutional on grounds that a candidate
would be making the false statement for financial or tangible gain—to keep
(or obtain) her own job. As in Alvarez, where the plurality distinguished
laws punishing fraud for financial gain, which survived First Amendment
challenge, with laws punishing fraud for non-financial or non-tangible reasons, which did not, false candidate speech might be seen as false speech
made for financial gain.
To begin with, I am not so sure that it is right to conceive of candidates
as running for office primarily for financial or tangible gain. Many candidates have political rather than financial motivations of running for office.
It is not clear from Alvarez if political motivations fall closer to financial
motivations or motivations to achieve affection, or how to deal with mixed
motive cases.
Further, the speech of a “campaign” is not simply the speech of the
candidate: it is the speech of the group of individuals associated with the
campaign. Many people associated with the campaign would not be making the false statements for financial gain but rather to see their candidate
prevail in the election. For this reason, a law barring only false speech
made maliciously by the candidate himself (and not his campaign) at best
would be partially effective. It would be underinclusive, pushing false campaign speech to independent individuals and groups who would make the
false claims on the candidate’s behalf. It would also not apply to false
statements made by independent groups in candidate election or made in
ballot measure campaigns.
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Most importantly, even given a candidate’s financial or tangible incentives to run for office, a law targeting malicious false candidate speech still
could be unconstitutional. Political speech remains at the core of the First
Amendment, and candidate speech is the most likely type of speech to
prompt selective prosecution as well as political manipulation of government authorities.
One possible way to save the constitutionality of a law aimed at false
campaign statements would be to limit it to statements made directly by
candidates that are easily verifiable, such as a statement about whether a
candidate is an incumbent. (Even that is problematic: is a person who used
to be a judge referring to himself as a “Judge” in an ad making a false
statement?) Excluded would be murkier statements such as whether a candidate supports tax increases. Sticking to verifiable statements limits the
amount of prosecutorial discretion. But it is a double-edged sword: if the
allegedly false statements are easily verifiable, then there is less of a need
for the state to come in and punish such speech. As Justice Kennedy explained in Alvarez, the better remedy for easily-checked false speech might
be counterspeech, or a database of truthfulness. Thus, even if there is a
constitutional right to lie109 in campaigns, the remedy is for opponents of a
lying candidate to credibly call that candidate a liar.110
While the matter is unclear, there are substantial arguments that state
laws barring or punishing false malicious campaign speech even by candidates violates the First Amendment after Alvarez. Professor Marshall’s
constellation of interests supporting false campaign speech laws—preventing “distortion” of election outcomes, a lower quality of election content,
voter alienation—is unlikely to trump the courts’ concerns about censorship
and partisan manipulation of these processes in speech at the core of the
First Amendment.111
If the state likely cannot ban or punish false campaign speech, it probably still could establish a “truth-declaring” commission as in Ohio. The
Sixth Circuit in Pestrak upheld such a commission structure before Alvarez.
Its reasoning seems to survive Alvarez. A government statement declaring
that a candidate has lied is a narrower alternative to the state barring or
109. Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment and the Right to Lie, ABA Journal, http://www.aba
journal.com/news/article/the_first_amendment_and_the_right_to_lie (Sept. 5, 2012).
110. The majority may be overly optimistic about the chances that counterspeech could change
minds, especially given evidence that voters—even informed voters—respond to emotional appeals in
campaign advertising. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Richard L. Hasen, & Daniel P. Tokaji, Election
Law—Cases and Materials 536–537 (5th ed., Carolina Academic Press 2012).
111. There is no doubt some tension here with the position of Justice Breyer on this issue and on the
issue of the constitutionality of campaign finance regulation. See Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution (Alfred A. Knopf 2005). In the campaign finance arena, Justice
Breyer has recognized First Amendment concerns on both sides of the issue.
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punishing the lie directly; indeed, the government statement is somewhat
equivalent to the “database” of military medal winners that Justice Kennedy
discussed in Alvarez. Like the database, a government statement provides a
source of government information that at least a portion of the public is
likely to view as objective. The truth commission differs from the database
in that government officials must exercise a subjective judgment about truth
and falsity.
Although a truth commission is likely constitutional, it is not clear that
it is a desirable approach to the problem of false campaign speech. A government truth-declaring function is subject to selective enforcement and political manipulation. In Ohio, prosecutions are rare,112 opponents bring
claims to the commission for political gain, and the results of commission
findings may be haphazard.
Consider a recent Ohio hearing over whether the Ohio Republican
Party lied in a Republican mailer about a pending redistricting initiative.
The bipartisan panel split 2-2 along party lines regarding the alleged falsity
of two statements in the mailer, but agreed 4-0 that there was probable
cause to believe that one statement in the mailer—that members of a proposed redistricting commission would be chosen in secret—was false.113
No doubt supporters of the initiative can use the Ohio commission’s findings of probable cause that the Ohio Republican Party made a false statement to try to influence voters in the weeks before the election. In some
ways, the cure of injecting the government into the political process right
during the elections may be worse than the disease.
V. CONCLUSION
It is disheartening to think that the Constitution contains within it a
right to lie in political campaigns. In an era in which it appears that political consultants have no compunction about running campaigns filled with
112. Aaron Marshall, Despite laws against lying, tall tales have become the norm on the campaign
trail, experts say, Cleveland Plain Dealer, http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2012/10/despite_
laws_against_lying_tal.html (Oct. 27, 2012) (“While most observers see lying in campaigns on the upswing, [Ohio Elections Commission Executive Director Philip] Richter said that complaints about alleged campaign falsehoods are actually down this year compared to previous years with just 38, compared to as many as 98 in 2010. . . . Records supplied by Richter show the commission has heard 176
complaints involving allegations of false and misleading statements in the past three years and found
violations in 14 cases—which is 8 percent of the time. . . . But the punishments barely redden a wrist.
In 13 of the 14 cases, the commission just let the violation stand as the only penalty in the matter. The
only fine levied in the past three years came in a 2010 case against a township trustee candidate whose
complaint the board considered to be ‘frivolous’ and rang up a $5,775 fine.”).
113. Joe Guillen, Does GOP campaign literature contain a false statement? Ohio Elections Commission to decide, Cleveland Plain Dealer, http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2012/09/state_elections_commission_fin.html (Sept. 20, 2012).
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lies,114 and in which the media’s descriptions of campaign falsity are themselves attacked as biased, it is tempting to think of a legal solution to this
political problem. The Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. v. Alvarez, while
fractured, points out the dangers of this approach, especially the dangers of
censorship and political manipulation.
Narrow laws aimed at stopping maliciously false speech about the conduct of elections and those laws targeting defamatory false statements about
candidates likely would survive constitutional challenge. The state also
does not have to be a party to false campaign statements: it has the power to
bar false statements from official ballot materials and probably to establish
a “truth-declaring” commission to make pronouncements about campaign
lies. Even if the commissions are constitutional, they may not be desirable.
After Alvarez, the state may no longer have the power to ban or punish
malicious false campaign speech, whether made by candidates or others.
The result of this conclusion is that we are likely to see more false campaign speech in elections, including some brazen lies. With candidates’
pants increasingly on fire, and with the wooden noses of campaign consultants growing ever longer, the question is whether counterspeech—from
opposing candidates, the media, and perhaps the government—will be
enough to give voters the tools they need to make intelligent choices. I take
solace in Jack Shafer’s depressing observation that most voters don’t expect
honesty from their politicians,115 and therefore they are less likely to be
misled by them.

114. See Jill LePore, Lie Factory: How Politics Became a Business, The New Yorker, http://www.
newyorker.com/reporting/2012/09/24/120924fa_fact_lepore?currentPage=all (Sept. 24, 2012) (tracing
history of political consultants).
115. Shafer, supra n. 9.
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